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The crafting of South Yemen’s political future is a core issue in Yemen’s 
multilevel conflict. A central role in that process is played by the Southern 
Transitional Council (al-Majlis al-Intiqali al-Janubi; hereafter, STC), an en-
tity that is increasingly perceived internationally as the representative of 
South Yemeni interests. While this role is in keeping with the STC’s own 
mandate, it is not approved of by all of the many rival actors involved. 
 • The STC was founded in 2017 with the aim of leading the territories of the for-
mer People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen to independence. Such calls for 
secession have long been popular with large parts of the population, but have 
gained new momentum since the onset of civil war in 2014. Reshaping the rela-
tionship between North and South has been central to a comprehensive conflict 
settlement in Yemen, and not just since the STC was founded.
 • The STC claims to represent the interests of the South and to provide its pol-
itical leadership. It sees itself at the forefront of the heterogeneous Southern 
Movement, which has endured numerous internal conflicts since its emergence 
in 2007 and has not yet been able to agree on a common leadership structure. 
Thus, the STC is neither the only political interest group of the South nor is its 
claim to leadership acknowledged and approved of by all organisations of the 
Southern Movement.
 • The fact that the STC is currently the dominant organisation in the Southern 
Movement is largely due to the support of the United Arab Emirates. As a re-
sult, the future leadership position of the STC, as well as its agency, are highly 
dependent on the interests of Abu Dhabi.
Policy Implications
Given the importance of the Southern issue in future peace negotiations in Yem-
en, it is necessary to take into account the range of key actors in South Yemen and 
to understand their relationship with each other. The European Union should 
continue to press for an understanding among these actors and support them in 
developing a common bargaining position. 
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The Rise of the Southern Transitional Council
South Yemen’s political future has been the subject of one of the most central – and 
longest-running – conflicts in Yemen, one that has also had a decisive impact on the 
course of the war in South Arabia, itself ongoing since 2014. There are a number of 
reasons why this conflict has long been neither the focus of news coverage regarding 
Yemen nor that of regional and international mediation efforts. Not least, there has 
been no actor who has assumed the role, or at least been perceived as playing the 
role, of representative of Southern interests to the outside world.
This changed with the establishment of the Southern Transitional Council 
(STC) on 11 May 2017. The fact that the STC is increasingly considered to repre-
sent South Yemen is due in part to its clever way of showcasing itself. When it was 
founded, for example, it referred to the “Historical Declaration” proclaimed several 
days earlier at a large demonstration in Aden, which, “bearing the will of the people 
of the South,” authorised Major General Aidarus al-Zubaydi, the later STC chair-
man, “to assume [...] the administration and representation of the South” and thus 
its “political leadership” (Nass i’lan ‘adan al-tarikhi 2017). Moreover, the STC now 
maintains “representations” with the European Union (based in Berlin), the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and with Canada to manage its external relations.
Second, thanks to significant support from the United Arab Emirates, the STC 
has succeeded in gaining political supremacy in South Yemen over the past three 
years as well as considerable leverage at the national level. For example, the Riyadh 
Agreement ‒ negotiated in Saudi Arabia in November 2019 after months of fighting 
between forces of the internationally recognised government of President Abdrab-
buh Mansur Hadi and the STC’s militias ‒ sees, among other things, equal represen-
tation in government, with the STC awarded key portfolios such as the Ministries of 
Defence and of the Interior. In the renegotiations necessitated by renewed hostili-
ties in May 2020, which culminated in an implementation agreement in December 
2020, the STC was able to push through more of its positions. 
Even though the new all-Yemeni cabinet began its work in Aden in January 
2021, the Agreement is not expected to last very long. The first breaches became 
apparent within only a few days, when the STC condemned various appointments 
made by Hadi by presidential decree as a violation of the Agreement and threat-
ened consequences. Nor is there anything to suggest that the STC has abandoned 
its ultimate goal of achieving independence for South Yemen. Although it with-
drew – following Saudi Arabian mediation in July 2020 – the declaration of au-
tonomy that had been proclaimed in April, the STC nonetheless renewed its funda-
mental demand for Southern secession (Al-Majlis al-Intiqali al-Janubi 2020). Some 
observers therefore interpret the STC’s participation in the unity government as a 
strategically necessary detour on the road to the longed-for independence (DeLoz-
ier and Bouchlaghem 2020).
The demand for secession is not a unique feature of the STC. Despite the ab-
sence of reliable polls, it is safe to assume that large segments of the population 
in South Yemen are likely to be critical of unity with the North. Other actors and 
organisations in the Southern Movement (al-Hirak al-Janubi), which emerged in 
2007 and from which the STC ultimately emerged, also favour secession – or at 
least autonomy – for the South. Nevertheless, the STC’s claim to leadership is not 
unchallenged – nor are its political positions congruent with those of the Southern 
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Movement. Rather, its goals and methods have been sharply criticised by key ac-
tors both inside and outside the Southern Movement. Given the importance of the 
Southern question for Yemen’s future, it is worth taking a close look at the genesis 
of this intra-Yemeni conflict, the emergence of the Southern Movement, and the 
STC’s position within it.
From Unification to War
Yemen can look back on 3,000 years of history. In its more recent history, how-
ever, it has been divided into a north and south for the longest time. Interrupted by 
peri ods of Ottoman rule (most recently 1872‒1918), the north was ruled by a Zaydi 
Imamate, whose foundations were laid in AD 897 and which was replaced by the 
Yemeni Arab Republic only after the revolution of 1962 and the end of the ensuing 
civil war in 1970. In the south, the British occupied the port city of Aden in 1839, 
founded a crown colony there, and soon controlled most of the south through the 
Protectorate of Aden. The dividing line between the Ottoman and British spheres 
of influence, the so-called Anglo-Ottoman Line, roughly demarcated what is now 
commonly understood as North and South Yemen. After independence from Brit-
ish colonial rule in 1967, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY; from 
1967‒1970, the People’s Republic of South Yemen) would emerge as the only Marx-
ist-oriented state in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
Ideologically, but also due to the state-led social-modernisation policy in the 
South, a competitive relationship developed between the two Yemeni states that 
was characterised by both military conflict and promises of unity. Shaken by fierce 
internal power struggles and the drying up of material support from the Soviet 
 Union, the PDRY Politburo was open to unification negotiations in the second half 
of the 1980s. The North, ruled since 1978 by President Ali Abdullah Salih, was will-
ing to negotiate, being affected just as greatly by the international repercussions of 
the ending East‒West conflict – in addition to being burdened by internal economic 
grievances. The decisive factor for both sides was the prospect of developing the oil 
deposits along the inner-Yemeni border.
On 22 May 1990, the North and South united (see Map 1 below), with the con-
stitution of the newly founded Republic of Yemen providing for a pluralistic demo-
cratic system – which “was largely a strategic choice [by the ruling elites] by which 
each intended to prevent the other from dominating” (Schwedler 2002: 48). Fol-
lowing the same logic, it was agreed that political power would be divided equally 
between the North and the South until the first free elections were held. The two 
state administrations initially remained largely intact separately, and the armies of 
both sides also remained under the respective command of Sanaa and Aden. Salih’s 
General People’s Congress (al-Mu’tamar al-Sha‘bi al-‘Amm) and its allied Islamist 
Yemeni Congregation for Reform (al-Tajammu‘ al-Yamani li-l-Islah; hereafter, “Is-
lah”) emerged victorious from the 1993 parliamentary elections. The former unity 
party of the South, the Yemeni Socialist Party (al-Hizb al-Ishtiraki al-Janubi), came 
in third. The resulting political dominance of the North led to the rapid deteriora-
tion of relations, which eventually resulted in a bitterly fought civil war – the sad-
dest chapter of which was the capture and sacking of Aden in July 1994.
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The South’s surrender on 7 July 1994 not only sealed Northern domination but laid 
the groundwork for the resurgence of the Southern question, insofar as thousands 
of Yemeni Socialist Party and Southern military members were either expelled or 
forced into retirement. Numerous former members of the Southern nomenklatura, 
such as Ali Nasir Muhammad, Haidar Abu Bakr al-Attas, and Ali Salim al-Baydh, 
provided significant support from exile for the Southern Movement that would 
emerge more than a decade later. The Southern Movement itself arose from a sit-in 
by former military officers protesting their forced retirement and denial of an ad-
equate pension in May 2007. Although the Yemeni Socialist Party was not banned, 
it would suffer marginalisation for several years after large parts of its cadre were 
expelled and the party’s assets confiscated. It did not regain political importance 
until a rejuvenated party leadership had decided, in 2005, to formally join an al-
liance of different opposition parties that included its ideological arch-enemy, the 
Islamist Islah. This step was rejected by many members of the old guard, who then 
began to turn away from the party.
The Emergence of the Southern Movement
In the coming years, the Yemeni Socialist Party visibly lost its status as the mouth-
piece of South Yemen, while the Southern Movement grew in importance. Origi-
nating from a protest by retired officers organised around the figure of Nasir Ali 
al-Nuba in 2007, it quickly developed into a mass movement that held demonstra-
tions at regular intervals in the major cities of the South. The demands raised on 
these occasions were initially limited to equal access to state positions and services, 
political and economic decentralisation, the introduction of (actual) rule of law, and 
better economic management of the country (Longley and al-Iryani 2008: 2). Calls 
for Southern secession – initially heard only sporadically, due in part to massive 
state repression – soon grew louder. With the Arab Spring that began in January 
2011, the vision of secession became capable of winning majority support within the 
Southern Movement.
The Southern Movement is a vivid example of the emergence of a social move-
ment. Conditions such as those initially deplored by the Southern Movement would 
Figure 1 
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be found in most regions of the country during the last decade of Salih’s rule. But 
while grievances exist everywhere, movements do not. Indeed, the emergence of a 
social movement requires one or more social movement organisations capable of 
mobilising resources and channelling them accordingly. And, South Yemen had no 
shortage of competent politicians and former officials who, disillusioned and side-
lined, were willing and able to contribute their experience and networks to the nas-
cent Southern Movement – in many places by drawing on the infrastructure of local 
Yemeni Socialist Party offshoots. Furthermore, a successful social movement needs 
a common identity that its members can adopt. In the case of the Southern Move-
ment, this identity was formed – especially among its younger representatives – by 
way of reference to the PDRY’s past statehood. It did so in particular by emphasis-
ing the PDRY’s sociopolitical achievements, thereby setting it apart from the North. 
In addition, whether and to what extent a movement gains adherents depends on 
its framing processes. For the Southern Movement, this framing was as follows: The 
problems faced by South Yemenis can be attributed to their oppression by the con-
servative, backward North. After the South secedes, these problems will vanish into 
thin air. Secession is therefore not only a desirable but, indeed, also attainable goal.
However, the original problem of the Southern Movement was – and still is – 
rooted in the multiplicity of its constituent social movement organisations. For 
example, a number of large groups in Yemen were associated with the Southern 
Movement already on the eve of the Arab Spring. These included the Higher Na-
tional Council for the Independence of the South (al-Hay’a al-Wataniyya al-‘Ulya 
li-Istiqlal al-Janub), led by al-Nuba, who describes himself as the “first founder of 
the Southern Movement” (al-Nuba n.d.); the Higher National Council for the Lib-
eration of the South (al-Majlis al-Watani al-A‘la li-Tahrir al-Janub), led by Hasan 
Ba‘um, a former senior PDRY government official from Hadramawt; the Southern 
Peaceful Struggle Movement (Haraka al-Nidhal al-Silmi al-Janubi), led by Salah 
al-Shanfara, a former member of the Yemeni Socialist Party faction in the Yemeni 
parliament, who in 2009 resigned from both the party and his mandate; and, the 
Leadership Council of the Peaceful Revolution (Majlis Qiyada al-Thawra al-Silmi-
yya), led by Tariq al-Fadhli, a former associate of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan 
and son of the last ruler of the Fadhli Sultanate that had lasted from 1670 up until 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of South Yemen in 1967.
It is hard to keep track of the exact number of organisations associated with the 
Southern Movement back then, as well as today. Some were obvious offshoots of 
larger entities; many, if not most, were politically meaningful only within the nar-
row confines of the governorate or district level; some dissolved and disappeared 
completely, whereas others re-emerged under a different name. On occasion, par-
ticularly smaller groups would change allegiance vis-à-vis larger ones, or complete-
ly merge into other organisations entirely. 
The advantages and disadvantages of such organisational diversity are obvious. 
On the one hand, the repressive Salih regime was unable to put an end to a “snake 
with a thousand heads” (Dahlgren 2010) in one fell swoop against the leader ship. 
On the other, internal conflicts inevitably arose – especially over fundamental is-
sues such as autonomy or secession. This was evident, for example, during the 
epoch al protests of 2011, when parts of the Southern Movement temporarily joined 
the protests in the North in the hope that an end to the Salih regime might make 
secession obsolete. The absence of a unified leadership structure also meant that 
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decisions made by some organisations were not supported by others. During the 
National Dialogue Conference (2013‒2014), for instance, the mere willingness on 
the part of some groups to participate in the working group on the Southern ques-
tion led to fierce controversy within the Southern Movement. The most pressing 
question then, as now, is therefore not only who legitimately represents the inter-
ests of South Yemen but also, and above all, who can be considered the legitimate 
representative of the Southern Movement.
The United Arab Emirates and the Southern Transitional Council
In retrospect, the National Dialogue Conference proved unsuitable for clarifying 
central questions concerning the political future of South Yemen. It is also true that 
the working group’s final recommendations were ultimately made exclusively by a 
group handpicked by Hadi, namely after certain representatives of the Southern 
Movement had withdrawn from the body in protest. The articles on the federal reor-
ganisation of the country in the draft constitution of January 2015, pushed through 
by Hadi, were then also partly responsible for the outbreak of the current war. How-
ever, it was the Houthis (Ansar Allah) who would use its publication as an oppor-
tunity to overthrow the Hadi government and extend their rule beyond the North. 
This new civil war then developed into a full-blown conflict drawing in international 
actors at the latest in March 2015, with the intervention of the military coalition led 
by Saudi Arabia. This changed the fortunes of the Southern Movement in that it 
introduced a regional actor, the UAE, that was to usurp the Southern Movement’s 
secessionist demands.
The UAE has been Saudi Arabia’s most important regional partner since the 
beginning of the military intervention. In South Yemen, Abu Dhabi became the key 
player after Emirati military units succeeded in mid-2015 in pushing the Houthis 
and their allied elements from within the Yemeni army back, first from Aden and 
then from other areas in the South too. The capture of South Yemen took place as 
part of Operation Golden Arrow, coordinated with the military coalition, and was 
hence an important step in the fight against the Houthis from the perspective of 
Riyadh and the Hadi government. At the same time, control over South Yemeni 
ports and waters was of particular importance to UAE interests – especially in se-
curing the maritime oil trade and the activities of the logistics company Dubai Ports 
World, which occupies a central place in the economic-diversification strategy pur-
sued by Abu Dhabi. Accordingly, securing Emirati influence in South Yemen and, 
related to this, containing rival regional forces such as Iran and Qatar as well as 
local actors such as Islah, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State (IS) are among the UAE’s 
long-term goals.
To achieve this, Abu Dhabi pursued several strategies. First, the Emirates took 
highly repressive action against those deemed a threat to its own interests. These 
included al-Qaeda as well as Islah operatives, and critics of the Emirati presence in 
general. International human rights organisations have accused the UAE of torture, 
targeted killings, and operating secret prisons in South Yemen for years (Human 
Rights Watch 2020). Second, various militias trained, equipped, and funded by Abu 
Dhabi are under direct Emirati control. Estimates put the total number of irregular 
troops at around 90,000, with the so-called Security Belt Forces (Quwwat al-Hizam 
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al-Amni) at their core. They initially gained notoriety in the fight against al-Qaeda 
and IS, but most recently in the fierce conflicts with the troops of the Hadi govern-
ment. Today, the Security Belt Forces are considered the military wing of the STC.
Another essential pillar of Emirati strategy has been cooperation with parts of 
the Southern Movement. The interests of the two parties overlap to a large extent, 
especially with regard to their hostility towards Islah – the Yemeni offshoot of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, whose containment in the MENA is an important component 
of UAE foreign policy. And although Abu Dhabi has not yet openly advocated the 
secession of South Yemen, which would run counter to the direct interests of both 
Saudi Arabia and the US, there is much to suggest that the UAE would ultimately 
agree to a declaration of independence as long as its own ideological, geostrategic, 
and economic interests remained protected.
To this end, the UAE played a key role in the establishment of the STC – whose 
success would be hard to imagine without Abu Dhabi’s involvement. The UAE sup-
ports the STC financially and materially alongside hosting many of its leading fig-
ures (including al-Zubaydi), whose entry into and exit from South Yemen is thus 
controlled by Abu Dhabi. Militarily, the STC is also highly dependent on the Emir-
ates, which provides payment for militias allied with the STC and supplied them 
with heavy weapons, long-range guided missiles, and drones in the 2019 fighting in 
Abyan with troops of the Hadi government – despite the latter also being Riyadh’s 
ally (DeLoizier and Bouchlaghem 2020; The New Arab 2020).
Even after the withdrawal of most of its own troops in 2019, the UAE remains the 
decisive player in South Yemen. For example Abu Dhabi occupies al-Rayan Airport 
in Aden, controls key ports (and thus the neuralgic points of South Yemen’s inter-
national cargo traffic), and, with Balhaf Port in Shabwa Governorate, runs the coun-
try’s only liquefied natural gas terminal. In addition, the Emirates maintain military 
facilities on the strategically important islands of Perim in the Bab al-Mandab and 
Socotra in the north-western Indian Ocean; have military supremacy in large parts 
of South Yemen with de facto command over the militia groups they finance and 
equip; and, with the STC, steer what is currently the dominant political organisa-
Figure 2 
Zones of Conflict and 
Control in Yemen, 
May 2020
Source: Sana'a Center 
for Strategic Studies 
(2020).
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tion in the South. However, control over the STC is not synonymous with control 
over the Southern Movement.
The Position of the Southern Transitional Council within the 
Southern Movement
Today, while the STC is one of approximately 20 organisations making up the 
Southern Movement, by no means all of these organisations accept the STC’s claim 
to leadership. Demonstrations both for and against the STC would already occur in 
many cities on the occasion of its founding, the latter primarily in the governorates 
of al-Mahra, Hadramawt, and Shabwa. Even some of the organisations listed on 
the STC’s website as partner organisations and signatories of the Aden Historical 
Declaration have made it clear that they do not support the STC (Dunya al-Watan 
2017). Leading figures in the Southern Movement, such as al-Nuba, sided with Hadi 
after the STC took power in Aden or founded new organisations such as Salah al-
Shanfara. The STC’s attempts to solicit support from the old Yemeni Socialist Party 
guard in exile likewise met with only moderate success. While the last president of 
the PDRY, al-Baydh, openly supported the STC, others – such as his predecessor in 
office, Ali Nasir Muhammad – kept their distance for example (al-‘Arabi al-Jadid 
2018).
The STC’s political dominance in the South Yemeni governorates is closely 
linked to the Security Belt Forces, which are most active in Abyan, Aden, al-Dhali‘, 
Lahj, and Socotra. The STC enjoys its greatest support today in al-Dhali‘ and Lahj, 
although its control there is not complete either (see Map 2 above). For example, 
one considerable power hub in Lahj is the al-Subayha Resistance (Muqawama al-
Subayha), a militia led by Hamdi Shukri al-Subayhi in the west of the governorate. 
Al-Subayhi, an avowed Salafist and separatist, is also commander of the Second 
 Giants Brigade – a group established and extensively sponsored by the UAE. Al-
though the STC and al-Subayhi cooperated in phases, he never submitted to the 
STC’s command. In April 2020, heavy fighting even broke out between the al-Sub-
ayha Resistance and the Security Belt Forces in Lahj and Aden (al-Khabr al-Yam-
ani 2020).
It is difficult to assess exactly how many actors and organisations in the South-
ern Movement actually or even formally support the STC today. It is easier to com-
pile the reasons why the STC meets with opposition within the Southern Move-
ment. On the one hand, there are pronounced and persistent regional identities, 
which, coupled with conflicts within the elite, some decades-old, continue to in-
fluence developments in South Yemen today. For example, the STC’s leadership 
comes primarily from the governorates of al-Dhali‘ and Lahj, while many autonomy 
advocates – as well as President Hadi and his entourage – are from Abyan. It is, 
therefore, more than a historical side note that Hadi and Abyan-born Ali Nasir Mu-
hammad belonged to the faction of the Politburo that lost to al-Baydh’s majority 
Hadramawt group in the South Yemeni civil war of January 1986 and fled to North 
Yemen. The rival factions are still known today as Zumra and Tughma respectively, 
both of which can be translated as “group,” although numerous secessionist sup-
porters can be found especially among the former members of al-Baydh’s faction 
(Tughma).
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In addition to the conflict over autonomy or secession, members of the South-
ern Movement are currently divided over the question of whether to support or re-
ject the Riyadh Agreement – and, related to this, the best choice of means to achieve 
their goals. The Supreme Council of the Revolutionary Movement for the Libera-
tion and Independence of the South (al-Majlis al-A‘la li-l-Hirak al-Thawri li-Tahrir 
wa Istiqlal al-Janub) can be seen as an exemplary counterposition to the STC. Al-
though it – like the STC – is in favour of secession, it vehemently rejects the Riyadh 
Agreement and holds the STC responsible for destroying the peaceful nature of the 
Southern Movement. Its leader Ba‘um now not only calls the STC an adversary of 
the Southern Movement but, more importantly, also terms its external supporter – 
that is, the UAE – an occupying power (‘Adan al-Ghadd 2021). Thus, the opposition 
that the STC is increasingly confronted with from among large parts of the Southern 
Movement is driven by a rejection of the UAE – even if only a handful of individuals, 
such as Ba‘um or Ali Muhammad (Abu Jiyad) al-Sa‘adi, dare to publicly brand the 
Emirates an occupier. Or, as the writer Bushra al-Maqtari puts it, “without the UAE, 
there is no Southern Transitional Council, and without the Southern Transitional 
Council, there is no future for the UAE in South Yemen” (2019).
Implications for Future Peace Negotiations
In his first foreign policy keynote address on 4 February 2021, US president Joe 
Biden announced a diplomatic offensive to end the war in Yemen and, on the same 
day, appointed Tim Lenderking the new US Special Envoy to Yemen. Although little 
concrete information about the US’s latest initiative has emerged so far, the South-
ern issue is one of the country’s key conflict areas – without it being addressed, 
comprehensive settlement of Yemen’s multistate conflict will be difficult to achieve. 
Even if South Yemen’s desire for independence has not yet received official inter-
national support, it is obvious that negotiations will in one way or another take 
account of the de facto partition existing between North and South Yemen. In any 
case, the participation of Southern Movement representatives in the upcoming ne-
gotiations is not only advisable but quite simply necessary. For a peace agreement 
without their participation would undoubtedly be short-lived, and would inevitably 
strengthen the secessionists within the Southern Movement.
For this, intra–Southern Movement negotiations in the run-up to later multi-
party negotiations will have to take place. The distance between the STC and other 
actors in South Yemen is too wide for the former to be recognised as represent-
ing the South by the majority of the Southern Movement, let alone the majority of 
South Yemenis. It is therefore necessary for the main representatives of the South-
ern Movement to agree in advance on a negotiating position. The EU and other 
international actors have tried in the past to bring representatives of the Southern 
Movement both at home and abroad to the negotiating table precisely with this goal 
in mind. These efforts should be pursued and intensified.
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